Accurate Democracy 
Centered Council.
Loring Ensemble Rule.
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| Accurate Democracy |
Election Systems.
Centered Council.
Loring Ensemble Rule.
print. translate. |
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Loring Ensemble Rule |
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Loring Ensemble Rule combines Condorcet's rule with STV. If this rule is not used, the central Condorcet candidate, surrounded by moderates and centrists, might get few first-rank votes and be eliminated during an STV tally -- in spite of the fact that she is the overall favorite. STV would then elect no central candidate, or merely a centrist with a narrow appeal. STV reps then elect the chairperson, usually from a majority coalition's center, off center from the council and the voters.
Loring Ensemble Rule a (LERa) makes the Condorcet winner exempt from elimination during an STV tally. Some ballots will move to her as other candidates are eliminated. In the end she will win a seat surrounded by reps who received ballots from less-central voters. LERa can use any variation of STV rules for quotas and transfers. It only requires helping the Condorcet winner avoid elimination. LERb elects her before the STV tally. Thus LERb gives the majority group 1 more than its share of seats. Separate votes for the chair and reps also give the majority an extra seat. But there are advantages in holding 2 separate contests: All STV votes and candidates are treated equally. It is easier to explain a basic STV tally than STV with 1 candidate exempt. (LERb matches those 2 points.) The best reason is that separate contests let voters rank candidates for chair on their ability to moderate and rank the STV candidates on their ability to advocate. [ footnote: LERa may resolve the debate about which quota rule is best. It can use Droop's quota, Voters/(Seats+1), for the chairperson and use the remaining voters and seats in Hare's quota, Voters/Seats, for reps. Droop's quota ensures the majority group gets the majority of seats while Hare's makes every vote count. Thus LERa gets the best of both quota rules.] Simulation research shows LERa is the best voting rule for consistently making the Condorcet winner the middle rep on a council. This is not a mere assertion but a finding from reproducible statistical research. |
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In this simulated election of a five-seat council, little stick figures  show the positions of voters. The ones with huge heads are the candidates.
Simulations show the LER voting rule is the best way to represent the center and all sides. Here it elects Al then Bev, Di, Fred, and Joe. (Labeled in bold) A Condorcet Series elects the 5 candidates nearest the central voter: Al, Bev, Fred, GG, and Joe. Nobody in the lower-right wins so the council cannot balance around the central voter. Bloc vote and Borda's rule elect the same off-center council. The STV winners? Bev, Di, Fred, GG, and Joe. No Al! Only LER has Condorcet centering with STV balancing! |
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Software to tally Condorcet, STV and LER is free on the Tool page. |
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