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Primer on Voting Rules |
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The best voting rules are inclusive, well centered, and decisive. The results can make a group more popular, stable and quick. |
| The tools get stronger from one voting task to the next: | ||
 | Introduction | Tragedies of democracy: What's wrong? |
 | Eras in Voting | Voting Progress: 19th Century, 20th Century, 21st Century. |
| A Small Example | Nine voters: Line up to vote, Plurality, Runoff, Two issues. |
 | Chief Executive | Instant Runoff Voting: Principle, Merits, Patterns. |
 | Council Elections | Proportional Representation: Principle, Merits, Patterns. |
 | Funding Choices | Fair-share Spending: Old Problems, Principle, Merits. New |
 | Policy Decision | Condorcet & Rules of Order: Principle, Merits, Patterns. |
 Philosophy.
Conclusions.
Prints.
↓ Next Slide ↓
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After this primer shows the need for better voting rules, the voting workshop will show the simple steps in each tally. The pdf version has both, plus pictures from PoliticalSim™. Then download free software to tally votes. |
Introduction |
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These tragedies were caused by voting rules often used
by nations and towns, co-ops and corporate boards. |
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The Northwestern U.S. has been ripped apart for
30 years, as forestry laws are reversed again and again.
Hasty logging in times of weak regulation wastes
resources. Sudden limits on logging bankrupt some workers
and small businesses. A political pendulum swings; it cuts
down forests and species, families and towns.
Agencies and businesses often lose wealth when a council changes hands and changes laws. These reversals are a major cause of war-like politics. Old ways of adding up votes fail to represent large groups in many places. In North Carolina, there were enough African- Americans to fill two election districts. But they were a minority spread out over eight districts. So for over 100 years, they won no voice in Congress. As voters, they were silenced. Can we end such raging or silent tragedies? Better tools give real hope; we can stop the tragedies caused by the old tools. | 
What happens when the political pendulum swings? |
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Our defective voting rules come from the failure to see there are
different jobs for voting; and these require different types of voting. | |
| We all know how to decide the simplest sort of issue:
A question with only two answers must be answered yes or no.
For such an issue, the “yes” and “no” votes are enough.
But as soon as three candidates run for one office, the situation becomes more complicated. Then a yes-no vote is no longer suitable. Sometimes what we want is not the election of a solitary official. We want to elect a whole council that represents all the voters. Then we do not need a system of dividing voters into winners and losers. Instead, we need a way of condensing them, in the right proportions, into their chosen leaders. Such a council (or budget) receives far more than half the votes! | 
Will their votes have any effect? |
Eras in Democracy |
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Some English-speaking nations still count votes by
England's old plurality rule. It elects only one representative
from each district; and winning it does not require a majority.
It merely elects whoever gets the most “yes” votes.
So the winners get only a weak mandate from the voters.
Where only the largest party in a district wins a rep, only |
two big parties thrive. So the voters get just two real candidates; who offer a very limited choice.
A council majority sets policies (dark blue in picture). A small change in one district's popular vote can shift all power, making policies swerve from side to side. Plurality politics is a war of winner take all. |
$ $ $ LAWS $ $ $
Typical Council Elected By Plurality Rule
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Proportional Representation (PR) was invented in the late
1800s. It ends some problems caused by plurality rule.
So most democracies have adopted PR.
It elects several people to represent each large district. It gives a group that earns, say 10% of the votes, 10% of the seats. Thus PR delivers fair shares of seats. |
This leads to broad representation of issues and opinions.
But usually there is no central party (C in picture). And the two biggest parties refuse to work together.
So the side with the most seats (blue and black) forms the ruling majority which then enacts policies skewed toward their side. |
$ $ $ LAWS $ $ $
Typical Council Elected By Proportional Representation
| New ensemble councils will elect most reps by Proportional Representation, plus a few by a central rule ( C in picture). Later slides show how a voting rule can pick winners with wide appeal and views near the middle of the voters. Its winners are thus near the middle of a PR council. |
So they are the council's powerful swing votes.
Most voters in the winners' wide base of support don't want averaged or centrist policies. They want policies to unite the best ideas from all groups. |
$$LAWS$$$
Ensemble Elected By Central And Proportional Rules
Democracy Evolves 
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A “centrist policy” enacts a narrow point of view;
it excludes other opinions and needs.
A “one-sided policy” also ignores rival ideas. A “compromise policy” tries to negotiate rival plans. But contrary plans forced together often work poorly; and so does the average of rival plans. A “balanced policy” unites compatible ideas from all sides. This process needs advocates for diverse ideas. And more than that, it needs powerful moderators. |
A broad balanced majority works to enact broad,
balanced policies. These tend to give the greatest chance for
happiness to the greatest number of people.
Excellent policies are a goal of accurate democracy.
Their success is measured by data on a typical voter's
education and income, freedom and safety, health and leisure.
Old tally rules tend to cause one-sided results and tragedies.
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A Small Example |
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| Let's think about an election with nine voters whose opinions range from left to right. The figures in this picture mark the positions of voters on the political left, right or center — as though we asked them, | “If you want high-quality government services and taxes like Norway or Sweden, please stand here. Like Canada? Stand here please. Like the USA? Stand here. Stand over there for Mexico's low taxes and government.” |
High taxes, great gov. services Low taxes, poor gov. services
Jump to the next slide by clicking the gray link: Plurality ↓
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Three candidates stand for office. A voter
likes the one whose political position is nearest. So voters on the left like the candidate on the left. Ms. K is the candidate nearest four voters.
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Does anyone win a majority? Yes, No.
Who wins the plurality or largest share? K, L, M. Who wins the second largest? K, L, M. Answers: Mouse over a question, but do not click.
A mere plurality gives the winner a weak mandate.
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K is nearest four voters. L is nearest two.
M is nearest three.
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Who wins a runoff between the top two candidates? K, M.
Two voters who supported L now vote for M.
This winner has the power of a majority mandate.
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Runoffs practically ask, “Which side is stronger?”
(Later, these voters will use a rule that asks,
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Candidate M wins the runoff.
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Voting rules behave the same when opinions
do not fit neatly along a line from left to right.
Here a group spreads out on two issue dimensions, left to right plus up and down. On the steps of their school, we asked them a second question. It was about an issue apart from taxes and services. |
“Please take one step up if you want more regulation.
Take a step down if you want less regulation.
Take more steps for more change.”
Which leaves more wasted votes, plurality or runoff? Which gives the winner a stronger mandate? |
Kay wins a plurality. Em wins a runoff.
Chief Executive |
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How does it work? You rank your favorite candidates,
as your first choice, second choice, third and so on. Then your ballot goes to your first-rank candidate. If no candidate gets a majority, the one with the fewest
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Here is an analogy: Each candidate puts out a box. A voter puts his ballot in his favorite candidate's box. The ballots are counted.
If the box gets a majority of the ballots, it wins. If not, the voter moves his ballot to another candidate's box. Or, he waits, hoping others will move their ballots to his favorite box. To break that deadlock, we have a rule: If a round of counting ballots finds no winner, the box with the fewest votes is eliminated. Its ballots go to each voter's next (2nd) choice -- probably a candidate with similar views and more popularity. These transfers make voters condense into large groups supporting strong candidates. Ballots are counted again to see if any candidate gets half of the current top ranks. In practice, each voter ranks the candidates as 1st choice, 2nd choice, 3rd etc. Then election officials move ballots between boxes or a computer tallies them. |
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In South Korea's 1987 presidential election, two
progressives faced the aide to a military dictator.
The progressives got a majority of the votes but split
their supporters. So the conservative won under
a plurality vote-counting rule. These rules elect
whoever gets the most votes; 50% is not required.
The winner claimed a mandate to continue repressive policies. Years later he was convicted of treason in the tragic killing of pro-democracy demonstrators. With Instant Runoff Voting, ballots for the weaker progressive could have transferred to help elect the stronger one. The U.S. also has seen major elections in which two candidates on the left split their voters or two on the right split theirs. Sometimes this increased our national tragedies. (Can you name some split elections and their tragic results?) |
From five factions to one majority.
2) Ms. Blonde loses. Her ballots move. 3) Ms. Green loses.4) Ms. Carmine loses.|
IRV elects leaders in cities large and small: London, Melbourne, Minneapolis, San Francisco, Sydney and others.
Students use it at Duke, Harvard, MIT, Rice, Stanford, Tufts, UCLA,
Cal Tech, Carlton, Clark, Cornell, Dartmouth,
Hendrix, Reed, Vassar, Whitman, William and Mary,
The Universities of: Cal, Il, Md, Mn, Ok, Va, Wa, Wi, and more.
In some places, people call this Rank Choice Voting, Preference Voting or the Alternative Vote. |
A picture in the transferable vote workshop illustrates individual ballots moving.
IRV lets you vote for the candidate you really like. And even if that option loses, your vote isn't wasted; it goes to your next choice. |
Council Elections |
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3 Single-Winner ElectionsA class of 27 wants to elect a planning committee. Someone says, “Elect a rep from each seminar group.” The top group gives Kay 3 votes and Ray 6 votes.But bluish majorities win in all 3 sections.
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Proportional RepresentationA better suggestion says, “Keep the class whole. Change the definition of victory from half of a small seminar to a quarter of the whole class, plus one.”Now bluish voters win 2 seats, a majority.
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That is, 60% of the vote gets you 60% of the seats,
not all of them. And 10% of the vote gets you 10%
of the seats, not none of them. These are fair shares.
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Chicago now elects no Republicans to the State Congress, even though they win up to a third of its votes. But for over a century Chicago elected reps from both parties. The state used a fair rule to elect three reps in each district. Most districts gave the majority party two reps and the minority party one.
Those Chicago Republicans were usually moderates. So were Democratic reps from Republican strongholds. Even the biggest party in a district tended to elect reps who were more independent. They could work together and make state policies more moderate. (The transferable vote workshop shows one way to get PR.) |
New Zealand switched in 1996 from Single-Winner
Districts to a blend of SWD and Proportional Representation.
A one-winner district exaggerates local issues and alliances.
Proportional Representation frees voters from district enclosures; so they can
elect a rep with a thin but widespread appeal.
The number of women elected rose from 21 to 35. The number of native Maoris elected rose from 6 to 15, which is almost proportional to the Maori population. Voters also elected 3 Polynesian reps and 1 Asian rep. Many people call this Full Representation or Proportional Voting. |
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A news firm might inform us better if it is ruled, not by its owner and advertisers, but by its voting subscribers. (McChesney and Nichols propose a $200 “news voucher” to help each citizen fund their choice of ad-free news publisher.)
Public campaign funding, as in Maine and Arizona, lets reps spend less time with rich sponsors and more with voters. (The Ackerman-Ayres plan gives each voter $50 of vouchers to donate. Anonymous giving means no political payback.) Ballot access laws make it hard for minor parties to get nominees on the ballot. The two big parties make those laws largely because they fear spoiler candidates. Better voting rules put that fear to rest. Optical-scan ballots, post-election audits and open-source software check fraud by election workers and corporations. |
Sabbatical terms make the current rep run against a former rep returning from sabbatical. Voters get a real choice between two winners. Each has a record of what they did in office. Plurality would tend to make the current and former reps both lose due to a party split. But better voting rules heal party splits. A sabbatical might pay the rep to work with others from all parties on a service project, a bus tour and a rural retreat.
Initiative voters get more choices and power with full-choice ballots and better tallies. They should set the political rules and ratify some laws such as pay for reps. But minority rights to ballots, reps and funds need constitutional protection from the majority of the day. Improve elections to improve everything a government does. |
Funding Choices |
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Electing reps is the most obvious use of voting rules.
Rules to set policies and budgets are just as important. In fact, they get used more often than election rules. They might be the only votes in a direct democracy. Proportional Representation distributes the council
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In the same way, Fair-share Spending allocates money fairly. It is the next logical step.
Democratic rights fulfilled through history:
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$$$$LAWS$$$$
Fair shares give minority voters some power.
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Membership groups often shirk competitive elections to avoid conflicts and hurt feelings. But members still compete over money to fund projects.
Often, some members use tricks to capture a lot of the budget. When that injustice is felt, others may grow rebellious, or leave. They want a rule that makes spending fair.
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Lack of Transparency and Accountability
The old way to set budgets blurs responsibility. Take deficit spending: Progressives may say too much is spent on big weapons and corporate subsidies; conservatives often blame the money spent on health, education and the environment. Every rep can claim, “I didn't spend too much.”
Protecting the environment is popular with both conservative and progressive voters. Reps don't dare attack it openly. So, to pay off some campaign gifts from corporate sponsors, reps slyly starve agencies that enforce environmental laws. Budget cuts have also starved OSHA and the auditors of corporate tax returns. |
Old Roller-Coaster Budgets
“Lower but constant funding is more productive than a roller-coaster budget that might average far more.” Alvin Trivelpiece, director, Oak Ridge National Laboratory The Texas Super-Conducting Super Collider was a multi-billion dollar project in the 1980s. This effort to build the world's largest cyclotron was supported by a majority in Congress for a few years... then dropped. The only thing built was a “billion-dollar hole in the ground.” Members might be more cautious about starting vast projects if they could not spend the opposition's share of the budget. And they should have the power to finish their projects with their own share. |
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The U.S. Congress lets a single rep “earmark” funds for pet projects in her district. In 1994, the 4,000 earmarks cost us $23 billion. Ten years later, the 14,000 earmarks cost us $45 billion. Earmarks let powerful reps take much more money to their districts than most reps do. Each rep votes yes or no to a huge “omnibus” bill. It holds hundreds of earmarks, some good, some bad. This budget system makes it hard to prove which reps are wasting money. At their best, earmarks let a rep use federal money to fund vital local projects that only locals see the need and chance to do. But there is a better, more responsive and democratic way to select projects, Participatory Budgeting. |
Participatory Budgeting lets local meetings research, talk and vote on how to spend part of a city's budget. This is a big step up for democracy. In South America, it spread from 1 city in 1990 to over 1000 today. The World Bank reports that PB tends to raise a city's health and education while reducing corruption. For the last 2 years, a savvy alderman in Chicago gave his “Menu Money” to PB. But due to an old plurality rule, more than half the votes were 'wasted': a majority of votes went to losers. Even the winning votes were wildly unequal. A vote for the playground was worth $501. But a vote for the bike racks was worth only $31. That is 16 to 1 and it's too unfair; we can do better. We can give every voter the power to guide a fair share of money. |
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In a citywide vote, each neighborhood or interest
group funds a few school, park or road improvements.
The city's taxes then pay for the projects as the School,
Park, and Road Departments manage the contracts.
Every neighborhood and interest group controls its share of spending power; no one is shut out. This makes (hidden) empires less profitable.
Each proposal needs support from a substantial group. |
If a plurality spends all the money, the last thing they buy
adds little to their happiness. It is a low priority. But that
money could buy the high-priority favorite of a large minority;
making them happier.
In economic terms: The “social utility” of the money and goods tends to increase if we each allocate a share. Shares spread out opportunities and incentives too. In political terms: Fair shares earn wide respect, as we each help big minorities to fund some projects. So our budget appeals to more people. |
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That is, 60% of the voters spend 60% of the money,
not all of it. A project still needs grants from many
voters to prove it is a public good worth public money.
So we let a voter fund only a fraction of a project.
How does it work? Like IRV: You rank your choices. Then your money moves to help all the favorites you can afford.
And a tally of all ballots drops the least-funded project.
(The movable vote workshop makes this process easy to grasp.) |
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Twin Oaks Community in Virginia has experimented with Participatory Budgeting methods for over 30 years. In 2009 they used Dr. Robert Tupelo-Schneck's new software to tally Movable Money Votes. |
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Fair shares can set the budgets of departments too.
Every “line item” starts with most of its past budget. You may write-in and rank higher budgets for the items. Your ballot can afford to pay your fair shares for your top choices. This is how it gives them votes. Each budget level of an item is like a project:
One at a time, the weak ones lose and the money moves.
If a level gets more than enough votes, the excess goes back to the donors, as in STV.
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So if we all agree, we can change budgets radically.
But if many disagree, they can moderate the changes. Yet a minority cannot slow the budget process. Each agency starts with [80]% of its current budget.*
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A minority can moderate a budget's change.
But a majority can make it rise or fall. * To vote less than about [80]% to basic services, such as
BRV lets a majority reduce their grants to agency X. This undercuts a minority's grants to X. So, to maintain the total for X, the minority must give it bigger grants. Then the majority reduces theirs again, and this cycle repeats. With BRV, nobody apportions the budget as they sincerely want it. In contrast, the fair-share rule above gives all large groups positive power to fund their favorites. |
Policy |
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The nine-voter Runoff shown above was a one-against-one
or “Pairwise” contest between candidates M and K.
Five voters preferred M over K.
Here is a second Pairwise test with the same voters. |
Candidate K loses this one-against-one test.
Candidate L wins by five votes to four. (Each person votes once with a full-choice ballot. There are several ballot styles.) |
K is nearest four voters. L is nearest five voters.
| Candidate L wins her next one-on-one test also. She has won majorities against each of her rivals, so she is the one candidate who best represents all the voters. She is the Pairwise winner. |
Could another person top candidate L? Yes, No.
Hint: Is anyone closer to the political center? Yes, No. Who is the Pairwise winner on page 9? K, L, M. Thus Pairwise picks a central chairperson or policy.
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L is nearest 6 voters; M is nearest 3.
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The winner must top every rival, one-against-one.
Option J tops option D if most voters rank J above D.
Each ballot's rank of J relative to D concerns us.
If another rule picks a different winner our “round-robin tournament,” or Condorcet winner ranks higher on most ballots. So it wins a one-against-one majority over that other rule's winner. |
The sports analogy is a “round-robin tournament.” A player has one contest against each rival. If she wins all of her tests, then she wins the tournament.
Each voting test sorts all of of the ballots into two piles. If you rank option J higher than D then your ballot goes in the pile for J. The option with the most ballots wins that test. If an option wins all of its tests, then it wins the election.* *If three or more lose to each other, then IRV can elect one of them. |
(More merits of the Pairwise or “Condorcet” rule...) |
| A policy needs good marks from voters on all sides. That is because every voter can rank it compared to other policies. So all voters are “obtainable” and valuable. This leads to policies with wide appeal. (A plurality or runoff winner gets no help from the losing side and doesn't need to please those voters.) | The Pairwise winner is central and popular: Most centrist and progressive voters like it more than any conservative policy. At the same time, most centrist and conservative voters like it more than any progressive policy. All sides can join to beat narrowly-centrist policies. |
Everyone helps choose our center.
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Most progressive voters rank Kennedy [Livingstone, Lafontaine]
above Clinton [Blair, Schröder]. So to win a majority over
Kennedy, Clinton must outrank him on ballots from
centrists and conservatives. She cannot hope to be the first
choice for conservative voters; still, she must seek their favor.
Conservative voters rank Bush [Major, Kohl] higher than Clinton. So to win a majority over Bush, Clinton must appeal to centrists and progressives. |
Every candidate needs the centrist voters, of course. But
every candidate needs the progressives and conservatives too.
When compared with Kennedy, Clinton needs those
conservative voters. And when compared with Bush,
Clinton needs the progressives.
In this Pairwise election of a moderator, a less controversial
candidate might top each of these polarizing politicians.
(A later page shows an interactive Pairwise tally table.) |
| Candidate M lost the last election by plurality rule. Now let's say her party gerrymanders the borders of her election district. They add neighbors (purple below) who tend to vote for her party; and exclude less favorable voters (the yellow voter missing on the left). So now her party is certain to win the new district. |
Reps will tend to come from the party's activist wing.
The old plurality rule is the easiest to manipulate. But the Pairwise winner, L, doesn't change in this case. And Proportional Representation also resists gerrymanders. |
Now K has 3 votes. L has two.
And M has four.
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Bribes, big campaign gifts, and jobs for friends
can make some reps switch sides on a policy.
Pairwise resists corruption well, as bribing a few reps
moves the council's middle, and the winning policy, only a little.
“Poison-pill amendments” are designed to make some reps change sides and oppose a bill they had supported. Pairwise lets reps rank the original bill, no bill, and the (poison) amended bill. They may shun the pill. Fair shares of seats and spending reduce the payoffs to those who bribe the biggest party. It can no longer seize more than its share of reps or money. |
Philosophy |
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Meetings often make interlocking decisions one at a
time. They use a yes-no process, with or without explicit
rules of order, agendas, and votes. Items decided early can shut out later options.
Or people may talk about all options at once but never clearly tell (vote) their second and third choices. So a minority pushing a single idea can appear to be the strongest group. And one person with a balanced idea but no eager supporters might drop it. The best rules avoid all those problems by ranking the competing motions (or budgets) on the same ballot. |
Groups with little time and many issues or conflicting interests, often end debates with votes, not consensus.
Their methods of discussion and voting each effect the quality of their decision and the group's morale.
Voting can be anonymous to protect dissidents. It provides equality for busy or unassertive people. Pondering a ballot or survey educates members about setting budgets and priorities. A straw poll can find the major opinion groups and focus a discussion on the strongest idea from each group or on the most central options. Some issues allow decisions that are co-operative, not adversarial or consensual: Multi-winner funding gives fair shares of power. Yet it doesn't let anyone dictate or block action. |
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When choosing a voting rule, a new Mercedes costs
little more than an old jalopy. That price is a bargain
when the votes steer important budgets or policies.
Does your car have an 1890 steering tiller or a new, power steering wheel? Does your organization have an 1890 voting rule or a new, centered and balanced rule? Today's drivers need the skill to use power steering —
A group may test drive a new rule in a survey.
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Which is more stable and quick? |
Tools Between People
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Voting rules affect our laws — and our views on life.
By making us practice either winner-take-all or sharing, rules change the way we treat each other and see the world. So our expectations about voting and government improve when we use better rules. They work less as tools to fight culture wars, more as tools to support the freedom of diverse communities. Happiness is strongly linked to good relationships. So a good way to increase happiness is to improve tools between people such as group-decision tools. |
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A set of policies sometimes cannot fit two groups with opposing values.
Moving to another place may be the surest way to get to the policies you want.
This is sometimes called “voting with your feet”.
That is practical when you have the freedom to move and diverse destinations to choose among. Such diversity is more likely when culture and technology give places economic independence through “local self-reliance.” Even when you can't move to a better city or country, you may still avoid willful authoritarians. Build your democratic organizations with fair egalitarians. Democracy improves in eras such as The Enlightenment.
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Conclusions |
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Many people are excited to learn that voting
does not have to mean “winner take all.” The best voting rules strengthen the ballots for voters.
This page shows that different voting tasks
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These reforms open doors for popular changes. e.g. Data shows Proportional Representation elects more women than plurality.
And this change leads to better health and education.
The data make it clear: Advocates for education, health care, a clean environment and a clean government should all work for better voting rules. Donors should too. If we are overwhelmed by urgent needs, we neglect the essentials, the structural roots of these problems. We continue to get bad public policies, due to bad representation, due to bad election laws. |
Issue campaigns lobby reps every week for years.
This eases one problem, but rarely fixes the source. Election campaigns cost a lot all at once.
Reform campaigns cost no more than elections.
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Elections
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Legislation
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Learn more in this e-book, Accurate Democracy.
Then build support in your school, club or town with FairVote, The Center for Voting and Democracy. Steps toward accurate democracy include:
This website has sim games and handouts,
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| All-in-1 editions have this primer, the workshop, graphics from PoliticalSim™ and the budget sim, plus statistics to compare nations. |
| Booklet size | Grade | Booklet | Flat | Font | Paper |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Paperback | 10 up | All-in-1 | All-in-1 | 10 | 7 legal b4 |
| Hardback | 12 up | All-in-1 | All-in-1 | 12 | 14 letter a4 |
| " español 1'ed. | 12 | Todo en 1 | Todo en 1 | 11 | 14 letter a4 |
| " español 2'ed. | 12 | Todo en 1 | Todo en 1 | 11 | 14 letter a4 |
| Pocket B&W | 9-12 | Primer | Primer | 10 | 4 letter a4 |
| Legal | 11 up | Primer | Workshop | 24 | 35 legal b4 |
| Flipchart | 11 up | Primer | Workshop | 36 | 70 legal b4 |
| Slides | 11 up | Primer | Workshop | 26 | screen |
| " Outline | 11 up | Primer | Workshop | 32 | screen |
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Flats are corner stapled. Booklets are center stapled, then folded.
The booklets are arranged for two-sided printing: Print half. Reload (restack if needed). Print the rest. The abridged B&W pocket primer prints well on black-ink printers. The others look best on color printers. The teacher's version has space for notes on b4 legal paper.
Covers printed on heavy card stock are nice for hardback and paperback size booklets. The paperback size includes voting cards.
If you would like more numbers and logic with fewer pictures, Democracy Evolves is again free to browse or print. It prints in B&W on the front and back of four letter-size A4 sheets. It can be corner stapled with no cuts or folds. The first page has the introduction to this primer; the other seven add to it at a first-year college level. Small screen viewers can also try a narrow version with pictures.
This is “open source” writing, so edit the slides as you will and add your own slides for other topics. For example, U.S. voters need concise statements of the principles and benefits in non-partisan redistricting, as practiced in Iowa, and public campaign funding, as practiced in Arizona, Maine, or North Carolina. You may want to skip some topics or change the wording to suit an audience. For legislators you might change “voter” to “rep” or “member” and you would do the opposite for a direct democracy. The latter might omit Instant Runoff Voting but keep Proportional Representation to select subcommittees. Thanks to Steve Chessin for writing the original version of the “elevator pitch” for Proportional Representation. He, Terry Bouricius, and Zo Tobi each wrote quick pitches for Instant Runoff Voting which were the basis for the IRV slides above. Overall editors include Tree Bressen, Cheryl Hogue, John Richardson, and Rob Richie. Many others have contributed ideas and writing.  Navigation: This page showed the need for better voting rules and their merits. The next page, a voting workshop, shows the simple steps in each tally and how they meet their goals. After that, you may want to read the one-page introduction to each of the six voting tasks. These tell how a task is like and unlike other uses of voting, what it must do, stories of tragedy and success, the best rule's name, its ballot and its main merits. Accurate Democracy is organized by uses of voting:
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Some people want a better Chinese translation. 
And some people want a better Arabic translation.
Please help them.
Dos voluntarios han hecho traducciones al español (Spanish):
Democracia con precisión y Democracia Certera. ¿Cuál te gusta?
Voting for rich men, poor men, “colored” men, women.
Proportional Representation for large political minorities.
Fair-share spending by big groups of voters or reps.
a 
Organize Voters, with 
Accurate Democracy 
