

Some Questions to Ask

Some basic questions to ask about any voting rule:

- Has any group used it repeatedly over several years?
- How consequential and competitive was their voting?
- What were the percentages of voter turnout and of effective votes?

What incentives does it give to voters and leaders?

- Is its pattern of winners erratic or dependable over the years?
- If it is dependable, is its pattern fair shares or winner takes all?
- If it is winner takes all, is the winner from one side or the center?
- If it is from the center, is the winner's appeal wide or narrow?
- How often was it manipulated by a gerrymander, a spoiler effect, a stacked agenda, strategic voting, or other rigged votes?

Some basic questions to ask about voting-rule research:

- Are the data from: 1) Real competitions, 2) Computer simulations with: A) normal distributions of voters and candidates B) weird distributions, 3) Concocted examples, 4) Mathematical proofs. Only the first really includes human psychology. Most sources cited here **use real data** or realistic simulations. Other kinds of data risk “garbage in, garbage out” and may be fascinating mathematically but misleading in real-life.

- Manipulations are best resisted by Condorcet-RCV hybrids.** They're even better than the usual majority RCV.^{4.2} Any decisive non-dictatorial voting rule can be manipulated at some time. So the operant questions are, 1) “How often can each voting system be manipulated in a realistic electorate?” 2) “How easy is the manipulation?” and 3) “How damaging is its effect?”

- Why do this work?** To help the most people, give them tools to make better group decisions, to allocate resources and to reduce conflicts, page 35. The multiplier effects are huge. So, many schools, clubs and towns are adopting RCV.

- Q: Can any rules cut battles of birthrates or indoctrination?
- A: FSV makes becoming the plurality tribe less profitable; a high voting age makes it take longer.

Glossary and Index

- Accurate democracy** gives groups fair shares of seats and spending. It cuts scams and enacts a policy that tops all rivals. **4 goals**
- a **Mandate** is the authority effective votes loan to a winner. It is a basic goal. Contrast a wasted vote. **Pages 11-**, 21, 57
- a **Majority** is more than half of the votes. **11-**, 14-, 30-, 56
- a **Plurality** option has the most votes — often not a majority. " **rules** use yes-or-no voting; contrast RCV **4-6**, 11, 23, 31-, 61
- a **Ranked Choice Vote** lets you rank your first choice and backups. It is a tool for effective votes and fair shares **14**, 33, 45
- a **Voting Rule** (system, tally, tool) has a ballot, tally steps, and a level of support needed for a win. **6**, 14, 21, 24, 30, **42-**
- a **Wasted vote**, for a loser, a winner's surplus or a powerless rep, discourages voting and weakens democracy. **12-18**, 23, 27
- a **Wrecking amendment** ruins a bill's chances or its effects. a **Free-rider** " doesn't relate to the original bill. **30**, **33**, 36

See also the **Summary and Index of Benefits** on page 34.

Acronyms and Synonyms

- | | <u>Pages</u> |
|---|-----------------------------------|
| Consensus process..... | 33, 36- |
| CT , Condorcet Tally, Pairwise Comparison..... | 28- 30- , 44, 54-56 |
| EC , Ensemble Council of CT plus FR New | 8- , 31, 54-55 |
| FR , Fair Rep , Fair Representation (US); PR, Proportional Representation. (See PRCV, STV below.) | 7, 16-21 , 54, 61 |
| MMP , Mixed-Member Proportional | 19-20, 55 |
| FSV , Fair Share Voting New | 22- 24- , 36-, 43, 46, 52- |
| RCV , Ranked Choice Voting: STV Single Transferable Vote, PRCV Proportional RCV, for Fair Rep..... | 42 , 48-51, 54 |
| IRV , Instant Runoff Vote (US), Majority Preferential Vote (Aus), AV, Alternative Vote (UK) or Hare, for SMD. | 14 , 39-42, 56 |
| SMD , a Single-Member District, contrast FR, PR | 6 , 16, 19 |

Draft Workbook Questions

1. Sets of ballots for practice voting tallies.

A) Ballots and a tally table for RCV1.

B) a tally table for CT1 with the same winner.

Chamberlin and Merrill found these two tools create the same winners in about 90% of their cases and sims with realistic distributions of voters and candidates.

C) a tally table for a set of ballots with a voting cycle.

✳️ 4. Enacting a Policy, Condorcet Tally

① [I_intro.htm](#)

1 [Chamberlin et al below, also Merrill.](#) ② [c_data.htm](#)

③ [I_data.htm](#) ④ [I_cycles.htm](#)

A Chair with Balanced Support

CT can elect a **chairperson or a few reps** to serve as **central swing voters** between the factions on a council.

To win, candidates need to earn widespread support.

This gives them strong incentives to help the whole council balance its process and policies. pages 8, 54-55.

A **Top-Four Primary** then an **RCV runoff** makes us focus on four big rivals. These 2 tools are better known than the Condorcet Tally is. And they almost always elect the central Condorcet winner when there is one.

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Topics that Need More Emphasis

It is hard and rare to find a leader whose **character** is strong enough to steer a big bureaucracy yet humble enough to reject bribes and other abuses of power. *** strong standards, ethics and will power. Practicality

Empathy.....

Abuses of power,

Bullying – Questionnaires or brain scans re fear & disgust. size and sensitivity of the candidate's amygdala

Corruption – Expose financial actions,

Why We Fall for Narcissistic Leaders, Starting in School

<https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/29/opinion/why-we-fall-for-narcissistic-leaders-starting-in-grade-school.html>

Contrast effects and uses for **Condorcet/RCV** with those for **RCV1 IRV1**.

=====

All voting rules are subject to some undemocratic flaws.

All decisive, non-dictatorial voting systems can be manipulated, sometimes. The operant questions are 'How often is each voting system manipulable in a realistic electorate, how easy is the manipulation, and how damaging is its effect?'[1] The evidence published in peer-reviewed journals shows Condorcet-Hare hybrids (C-IRV) resist manipulation best. They are even better than the usual majority IRV (M-IRV).

See also pages 15 and 16.

Uses for Central Voting Tools

In actual elections as well as in simulations, we have seen the **Top Four Runoff** tends to pick central winners.

It can elect a **moderator** to a council, recall page 8,
or moderate reps for districts in MMP, page 17,
or senators to make an upper house,
or elected judges.

But is it likely to elect diverse reps? yes or no?

Who is the Condorcet winner on page 13?

Do CEOs mostly **moderate** or **advocate**, e.g. a mayor?

We have found the **CT/RCV** tool will pick the central winner and is the hardest tally tool to manipulate.²

It can elect enact a balanced policy. pages 33, 56.

It can select the base number for **FSV**, page 26,

or one plan for all the ongoing budgets, page 46.

But is it likely to spread spending fairly, yes or no?

RCV is most likely to fail at electing the Condorcet winner when strong factions of the **left** and **right** squeeze out those more **central options**. They might offer more **policy** options to divide the central interest groups. Legislation for policies or budgets offer almost infinite possibilities for variations aimed at arly eliminations.

RCV has slightly different effects, incentives and uses.³
Games will let us play in each tally to feel how it works.

Answers: No. L. Discuss this. No.

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Which **proposed budget items** are Ongoing Budget Items (OBIs) and which are One-Time Resource Allocations (OTRAs)?

*Some proposals might be illegal or ineligible for this funding source. The departments which must implement proposals might decide some would be dangerous or unworkable.

Important "land use" proposals often require a long process with expert evaluations, alternative proposals and community education and feedback.

First fund the OBIs through a Condorcet Tally. Fund the Ongoing Budget Items through Condorcet. Then fill in funding gaps through Fair Share Voting. **

First, vote on OB Items through a Condorcet Tally. Then fill in funding gaps through Fair Share Voting. **

** eases, relieves calms **our** votes being wasted by-**scheming** manipulators.

Ranked Choice Voting for reps is as easy as we played it. It doesnt raise the following concerns; they just relate to adjusting too many budgets

Voting to elect a rep or a council is simpler. Setting budgets is always slower than vtg for reps

run out of the **time and** energy

Voting for reps is free of the concerns below and on p. 14. picked **his higher treats** from **among** so many **dif.** treats, to **try to** help

2 reps of a kind is always better.

~~reset laborious; assess judge appraise value~~

LAR would Fund the sure winner wo/ using up a lot.

Voting for a set of budgets also avoids the **sequence** of winners and losers affecting the final set of winners.

proposed plan

Consensus and Voting

Group decision-making has two linked processes:

1) A **discussion process** might have a facilitator, an agenda, some reports and proposals. Each participant may ask to add or alter proposals. This process might close key options before the decision process. page 33

2) A **decision process** asks the members concerned, "Which proposals have enough support to be winners?"²

Voting only **yes or no** leads us to discuss and decide *one* formal "motion" at a time in a very strict sequence. It stifles the sharing of ideas and development of plans.

But both **consensus** and **ranked choice ballots** let us decide some closely-related options at the same time. Both reward blending compatible ideas, pages 9, 31 and polarize us less than yes-or-no voting. " 14, 46, 56 So more members want to help carry out the decision soon and make it work; fewer try to slow it down.

Why Take a Vote

Discussing an issue well often resolves most parts, with mandates up to 100%. Yet we might want to decide some parts with the best voting tools. Why?

The best rules *strengthen* some reasons for voting:

- 🚩 Choice ballots can **speed up meetings**. pages 27, 33
- 🚩 Secret ballots **reduce social pressure** and coercion.
- 🚩 Well-designed ballots and tallies **promote equality**: Even busy or unassertive people can cast full votes.

Complementing Consensus

Groups that seek consensus on basic agreements may vote on other issues: They may vote on a minor **detail** like a paint color or on a list of optional **projects**.

Fair Share Voting gives fair shares of power.

Inclusive yet fast, it won't let one person block action. It is cooperative, not consensual nor adversarial. It is less about blocking rivals, more about attracting allies. Its ballot guides a voter to limit and prioritize projects. Its tally finds the collective priorities for the intersecting interest groups. We may modify our FSV results through our usual process.

All majorities prefer the Condorcet winner.

A proposal needs to top each rival by 50% plus one; and we may require it to win 60% or even 100% over the status quo on issues involving our basic agreements. If so, 41%, or even one voter, may block a Condorcet winner by convincing us it breaks a basic agreement.

Carpentry Analogy

The nice consensus methods are like nice hand tools, and these nice voting methods are like nice power tools. The power tools speed cutting through piles of boards or issues, and cutting through a steel-hard one. The hand tools help us discover and develop insights into new options.³ So most of us want both kinds of tools.

This primer told the *stories* of the best voting tools. The games will let us *be inside* the simple tallies.

Games Can Let Us Inside the Tally

In a Condorcet tally, the winner must top each rival, **one-against-one**. Two games show how it works.

- 1) 🌟 Flag L stands at our **center**, by the median voter. Flags J, K and M surround L, 2 m. or yards from it.
 - 🌟 We asked nine voters: “Are you closer to J than to K?” If so, please raise a hand.” Only one raised a hand. We entered J vs. K, etc. in the **pairwise table** below.

against	J	K	L	M
for J	—	1	3	4
for K	8	8+1=9	4	5
for L	6	5	—	5
for M	5	4	4	4+5=9

The nine voters gave L a majority over each rival.


- 2) 🌟 Flag L has a ribbon 1 or 2 m. long and a longer rope.
 - 🌟 If the ribbon reaches to you, the ribbon policy gets your vote with its narrow appeal.
 - 🌟 But if the ribbon cannot reach you, the wide appeal of the rope policy gets your vote. Which one wins?

If the flags mark places for **a heater** in a cold room:

1. Do we put it at our center or in the biggest group?
2. Do we turn on its fan to spread the heat wide?
3. Do voters on the fringes have any influence?
4. Can the median voter enact any policy alone?
5. Do we get a balanced or a one-sided policy?

4. Watch Condorcet Find the Center

This map puts a line halfway between AL and a rival. Voters ● on AL's side of each line are closer to AL, so they rank AL over the rival. The long line has more voters on AL's side than on Joe's. So AL wins that test. AL wins a very different majority over each rival here. To do that, AL's political positions must be *central* and have *widespread support*, as described on page 31.




In contrast, **PRCV** requires the most **intense support**, top-rank votes, to avoid early elimination. See page 48 ● **RCV1** does too, with a high finish line of 50% + 1 vote.

Condorcet Tally, CT, the Complete Set of 1 Against 1 Runoffs


Page 12 showed the one-against-one runoff contest between the policy positions of reps **M** and **K**. Five reps ranked **M's** position over **K's**. $5 > 4$

Here are the other 1-on-1 tests in the same council:
Rep **L's** position tops **K's** by five votes to four. $5 > 4$



K is nearest four voters. **L** is nearest five voters.

Rep **L** wins the third and last test by six to three. $6 > 3$
She has won majorities against each of her rivals.
So she is the “**Condorcet winner**.” $L > M$. $L > K$.



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L has six votes.

M has three.

The goal in a **Condorcet Tally** is this:
**Win majority victories
over every single rival.**

The winner must top every rival, **one-against-one**.

A good **analogy** is a round-robin tournament.


A player has one test with each rival, one at a time.
If she wins all her tests, she wins the tournament.

Each voting test sorts all the ballots into two piles.
If you rank option **K** above **L**, your ballot goes to **K**.
The option that gets the most ballots wins this test.
If one wins all its tests, it wins the Condorcet Tally.*

Why Use a Condorcet Tally (CT) for Policies

- * **Choice ballots:** Rank the alternatives on one ballot so **Simplify** the rules of order, **speed up** the process and **Reduce agenda effects**, from simple errors and **gridlock**, to free-rider and wrecking amendments.
- * **No split-vote** worries as duplicates don't help or hurt each other. An ad hoc majority can rank all of their favorites over the other options. Ballots from all voters help decide which one of the majority's favorites wins.
- * **A balanced policy** tends to be **stable** and settled. Yet, **a balanced process** can **calm** some fears about reviewing and **changing** a good policy to improve it. This saves time and builds respect for democracy.

* In one tally, majorities might rank $K > L$, $L > M$, and $M > K$.
RCV can break this unusual tie.²




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Drop the one with the fewest firsts.

4. Enacting a Policy

Enacting a policy is a type of one-winner election. We may anticipate it will work well with **RCV**. But it is different from electing a leader to strongly advocate for one side, political party or faction.* Most groups want a consensus policy, or at least a moderate, central policy.

Problem 1: Groups often struggle to find the Center of opinion.



Goal 1: Policies with Wider Appeal

A **plurality** or runoff winner gets no votes from the losing side and so doesn't need to please those voters. We want to make each option seek support on all sides, because every voter can **rank** it against its close rivals. This way, every voter is “obtainable” and valuable.

So the winner is well balanced and widely popular.^{2,3} It gets a majority from voters on the **center** and **right** over any **leftish** policy. At the same time, voters on the **left** and **center** rank it over each **right-wing** policy. **All sides** rank it over **narrowly-centrist** policies.

**Discussion question: Does a mayor mostly moderate or advocate and lead?*


A Less Rigged Agenda Now!

Some meetings concoct a policy by a series of yes-no choices, with or without rules of order, agendas or votes. An early proposal might have to beat each later one. An early decision might preclude some later proposals. So “**stacking the agenda**” can help and hurt proposals.

Other meetings discuss the rival options all at once. But often, many members express **no backup choices**. So similar options split supporters and hurt each other. Then a minority pushing one option might seem to be the strongest group. Even sadder, a member with a well-balanced option but few eager supporters might drop it.

Too often, a committee chooses all the parts in a bill. Other members can say only yes or no to that **bundle**. It might include free-rider or wrecking amendments.

Rigged votes often build a bad policy and animosity. To reduce these risks, let the members rank the options.⁶



A Policy-Choice Ballot

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Option</u>
<u>3</u>	Continue discussion
<u>2</u>	Original bill, the main motion
<u>1</u>	Bill with Amendment 1 (a free rider?)
<u>8</u>	Bill with Amend. 2 (a wrecking amend.?)
<u>7</u>	Bill with Amendments 1 and 2
<u>4</u>	Postpone to a definite time <u>7</u> days
<u>5</u>	Refer the bill to a committee
<u>6</u>	No change (a vote for gridlock exposed?)

Any “Incidental Motions” do not wait for the ballot. These include a personal complaint or request.