Evaluation of ranked-ballot voting methods

Note that, according to Gibbard and Satterthwaite, all of the systems I am considering here are sometimes vulnerable to voter manipulation. Satisfying the criteria I find important tends to minimize chances for manipulation.

Summary of the methods' criterion compliances

	Baldwin	Borda	Bucklin	Carey	Coombs	Copeland	Dodgson	Hare	Nanson	Raynaud	Schulze	Simpson	Tideman
Pareto-optimal?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
majority?	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Condorcet?	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
monotonic?	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
clone-independent?	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES
mutual majority?	YES	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES
Smith?	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES
reverse-symmetric?	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES
reinforcing?	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Schwartz?	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
nonmanipulable?	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO

# Coombs fails reinforcement

# precinct 1

8:B>C>A>D

6:C>D>A>B

4:D>B>C>A

# precinct 2

8:B>A>D>C

2:B>C>D>A

6:C>A>D>B

2:C>B>D>A

2:D>B>C>A

Back to Ranked-ballot voting methods

Robert Hampton “Honky” LeGrand III ’98