7 nk #4S"uܿf333C.q݇݇$ݫx3# C7z*ޤ]ܑ.xc.The Functions of Voting in Government; Representation Legitimacy Questions on Diversity .c1.Some Effects of Voting Systems ; political, social, and normative This section starts with the essays introductory quotations. Given a broader subject and more space, I would argue that the effects of campaign contributions, advertising, and reporting out-weigh those of a voting rule in influencing the results of elections. Nevertheless a dysfunctional voting rule will hurt a polity in many ways. The rule influences everything from campaign styles to the elected representatives ideological rigidity or flexibility to negotiate. We will look at stability, legitimacy, alienation, and questions of dicersity. Other factors wtih great influence on the political [quality of social life] include: PR with PA, federalism [CSF], progressive taxes codes, international corporations and trade, unionism, .c2.Ballots and information costs; of manipulation Any multi-candidate voting procedure has two aspects: (1) a balloting method (specifying the nature of preferences that the voter is permitted to express), and (2) a decision rule (specifying how voter preferences are to be aggregated to determine the election result). (Merrill, page xv) In devising alternative procedures, one must be careful not to complicate unduly the job of the electorate. The simplicity of the balloting method helps ensure that voters are capable of voting as they intend with a minimum of mistakes. Relative freedom from opportunities to manipulate the outcome by misrepresenting preferences is one factor that helps in achieving simplicity and fairness to voters. Simplicity of the decision rule aids public understanding and acceptance of the outcome, and thus, the legitimacy of the process. (Merrill, page 8) Is is Voters often consciously feel burdened and stressed by the work of decision making. If voters cannot manipulate the system, then they need not worry about strategies. This minimizes their information cost or effort in voting. The easier voting is, the greater the turnout and the percentage of properly completed ballots. { That in turn leads to socially optimal beneficial decisions and a sense of legitimacy in government. So we must keep the voters job simple. This criterion allows only one ballot and to that end no primary and no runoff elections because those at least double the costs to the voters (and the length of the campaigns). It also requires simple ballots; it does not allow utility voting formulas or the need to estimate the likelihood of ties. . Single-vote plurality ballots appear easier at first than any type of multi-candidate ballot. But that systems many opportunities for manipulation often force serious voters to worry about strategies. Single-vote plurality has many other inherent flaws for multi-candidate elections as shown in the tables above. These The numerous/profound flaws make it [plurality voting] dangerous to the legitimacy and stability of government policies. Rules of order and agenda steps must be minimized. Neimi showed that approval voting has many sincere strategies which may confuse voters. I would add that this may lead to errors by voters and gives less weight to people who do not understand the possible strategies. It also gives less weight to those who choose not to vote strategically. The information costs of CSTV are less then those of other systems because voters have less worry and concern over strategies. This leads to more completed ballots; that is, more complete information for making better social choices. Limiting the number of candidates makes every type of ballot easier. Bold that sentance? In terms of information, CSTV costs less than other systems because voters have less concern over strategies how or whether to manipulate it, calculation of utilities and ties. Even the non-sophisticated voters must choose amoung the common strategies for approval voting. 1)Vote for the candidates you honestly approve of. 2)Vote for about half of the candidates. 3)Vote for one and only one of the top two candidates and as many minor candidates as you like better than that one. 4)Vote for just one of the top two candidates and dont bother with the rest. 5)Calculate your utility for each candidates victory. Add all of these scores and divide by the number of candidates to find the average utility score. Vote for all of the candidates who you score above the average. .c3.Utility ballots versus rank-order ballots; All utility ballots are difficult. Most ask a voter to rate each candidate on a scale of 0 to 100. Approval asks a voter to cast 1 vote for each candidate whom he feels has a higher utility value than most of the candidates. Utility ballots require that a voter who wants to optimize his influence must calculate his utility for each candidates victory. That is, how much the voter expects to gain or lose if a candidate wins. Also he must estimate the chance (probability) of each candidates tieing for the win to make the voters ballot the one which decides the election. These numbers must be processed through a statistical normalization formula. We can automate the calculation but each voter must find or sense the numbers to enter for his vote. This is personal and presents a major burden to all voters and a source of inequality to voters who lack high-quality information and facility with statistics mathematical concepts. People must find, read, understand, and remember all of the information in advance of the election, then act on that information rather than simple preferences. Ranking candidates is easier. The information and calculations required for accurate voting on utility ballots will lead to errors by some voters in planning their optimal ballot. as explained on page 20 Such errors will lead to outcomes with less than 100% utility efficiency. So Borda and Black, both of which score higher than approval voting, might in some electorates surpass even Merrills standard-score voting system. From rank-order ballots we can estimate approval ballots perhaps better than many voters can because we know who the front runners are and how to divide each ballot to vote for one and only one front runner. Rank numbers are the most convenient data for calculating the winner under Condorcets rule. Utility efficiency attempts to measure how likely a voting system is to elect the candidate with supporters who feel strongly and opponents who don't much care. Many theorists people are skeptical about trying to compare utilities inter personally; so Condorcet efficiency remains the most widely accepted measure. Ballot positions effect election outcomes. Some voters tend to simply vote for the first name on their ballot. Ballots with only two candidates give a __% advantage to the first name. Multi-candidate ballots have less difference between most ballot positions - so they are more fair. The first ballot position should always be for None or Status quo. Brams rule tells voters to approve less than half of the candidates. Once again, with the divide and conquer strategy, new candidate(s) can divide the opposition into several camps, none of which can get get enough votes to win. Unlike CSTV and MSTV, plurality voting systems let manipulators do that without losing any of their own votes and without risk of electing the opposite wing. Utility scores ambiguity for political philosophers is reflected in their difficulty for voters. xc.Utility efficiency Aristotle's maxim that government should seek the greatest happiness for the greatest number .c2.Condorcet efficiencys effects; Condorcet efficiency, the ability to select pick-out choose the Condorcet winners in elections which have them, has great importance because these median candidates are a happy result for the greatest number of voters. { Consistently centrist politicians try to produce consistently moderate policies; moving only as voters concerns do. Corporate leaders say this pattern helps them develop solid business plans. It also suggests greater legitimacy in those policies and governments in contrast to the wide policy changes which sometimes occur when one major plurality party takes control of government away from the other major party. CSTV elects centrists better than any other voting system. [Extrodinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds ] When a society polarizes, finding a strong moderate option or candidate may be crutial to political legitimacy and social stability. Or it may lead to inaction or universal frustration or both. This is not necessarily the greatest total happiness as utility voting systems attempt to define it. It seems we do not yet have the measures or means to reach the Aristotelian goal of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Move, but where? All voters influence which centrist candidate will represent their district. So a centrist with a broad view of constituents needs or desires and an open mind will pick up fringe voters to help beat narrow-minded centrists. Then again, a narrow-minded centrist might be ranked higher by the majority of voters: those near the center. Plurality voting, in contrast, gives no influence to voters outside of the two or three major parties. Parties which want CSTV geographic seats must espose more moderate centrist policies than parties seeking plurlaity geographic seats. This reduces the political ideologs perenial hope of capturing an elective office by getting out his voters to swing the jurisdiction toward one ideologys policies. .c2.Manipulations effects; Such manipulation may perniciously undermine the selection of the candidate with the strongest support broadest appeal and call into question the legitimacy of the winner. (Merrill, page 7) A perceived lack of legitimacy may have dire consequences for a government which does not often rely on the use of force. Get Merrill 8, 10 If a voting system rewards manipulative voters, then over time such people win more than their share of public decisions. Other voters see them as shrewd smart wily, effective. Other People imitate the manipulative behavior and it seeps into everyday life. Even without this manipulative aspect, any adversary democratic process such as voting is a poor model for daily life. Jane Mansbridge notes that The subversive effect of adversary procedure on unitary feeling makes it essential that the necessary dominance of adversary democracy in national politics not set the pattern of behavior for the nation as a whole. (Mansbridge, page 298) Eventually most people see the benefits of manipulating a group decision-making system as an unfortunate fact of nature few realize that the phenomenon results from flaws in poorly-designed social-choice democratic tools. power hungry Example of a unitary issue Example of an adversary issue Move c.Transitions from unitary to adversary democracy In Beyond Adversary Democracy, Jane Mansbridge argues that every democratic group needs to examine whether its members interests are similar (unitary) or in conflict (adversary). A groups will function best if it selects tools which fit the members pattern groups needs. But sometimes a unitary democracy must decide an adversarial issue - and vice versa. Then the democratic decision-making tools must be able to make a smooth transition from unitary to adversary democracy. Table from her page 5?. Mansbridge argues convincingly that no vote should be taken when the members of a group have a unitary interest in an issue. In such cases they need the tools to facilitate group discussion. But we need to take a vote when some members interests are opposed to other members. Rank-order ballots can show a wider range of agreement - disagreement than approval votes can. And CSTV is the best last, decisive step in such a decision process. When all voters have similar (unitary) interest in a problem, they need discussion to find and test a good policy. When the voters interests are at odds (adverse), they need a good voting system. 1) unanimity as consensus - Every voter gives first preference to candidate A. / Only candidate A gets any approval votes - this seems less likely than first preferences in multi-candidate elections. 2) (acquiescence) as consensus - Every ballot lists candidate A in the top half and above the second highest Borda scorer. (According to Brams rule they should vote approval for A). / One and only one candidate gets an approval vote from each and every voter - a weaker criterion. Here approval may be better - though we must ignore Brams rule that each voter should cast approval for one and only one of the top 2 candidates. 3) unanimity or acquiescence minus one. {footnote: If the one is strongly effected by the policy, then often others dissent to protect the minority and continue the search for a better solution. Two or more dissenters form a mutually reinforcing faction. That is a very different social dynamic in a small group then one lone dissenter. It can be much more dangerous if they tell each other they feel ignored and alienated.} 4) extraordinary majority - two-thirds is required by many constitutions for amending / approval voting has no analogous criterion; 5) simple majority - one candidate gets over half of the first preferences/ approval voting has no analogous criterion 6) Condorcet - one candidate bests each of the others in pairwise contests / here approval depends on plurality, a weaker criterion. 7) elimination - A committee might allow its chairperson to decide whether debate should be continued if no consensus, majority, or Condorcet winner appears on the original, pre-elimination ballots. If voters do not find a Condorcet winner then they do not have a stable decision. At least one of the candidates can beat the option chosen. If they allow a motion to reconsider the question, then they could overturn their decision... again and again and again. But if they do not allow any reconsideration, then they may be stuck with hasty decisions. Recall should be allowed but all of the original options must again be on the ballot (plus any new ones) [A motion to reconsider may be made only by people who voted for the winner or in cases where there was a Condorcet winner] Minor changes in the ballots used by an elimination process sometimes lead to [cyclical majorities]. None or the status quo should be included as an option in any multi-candidate voting system. Voters who win [fundamental changes of their group or societys social contracts such as] constitutional changes, unification with or dissociation from their organizations/states, have an ethical obligation to pay [for] the [costs incurred / expenses caused] by their victory: the voluntary emigration of any losers who want to leave[ the altered social contract]. For surveys on issues with more than two distinct options, CSTV is a good analysis tool. For instance, it can show which urban design proposal is the Condorcet candidate. It cannot show which solution is favored by the most active and vocal citizens, nor how strongly respondents feel about an issue. Utility thermometers are better for issues with continuous scales such as intensities of opinions. Survey questions usually covers only one issue and leaves no uncertainty about the position of options relative to the voters position. The relative dispersion of voters opinions to survey responses should be 1:1. The researchers must pretest the questions and adjust the response options to ensure they fit the communitys range of opinions. Use Dodgson to see how many voters, or what percentage of the electorate, need to be persuaded or educated 1) to get our candidate elected or 2) after a Hare election to create a Condorcet decision. The greatest pairwise loss will usually equal Dodgsons score. Use Kemeny to see how much one must persuade or move these voters. Use Borda or Kemeny to see if the Condorcet winner is also the utility winner. If not, then we may want to continue debate. How far is the Condorcet winner from the Borda or Kemeny and question why. (The broadest appeal does not equal the strongest appeal.) Look for clusters in the distribution of ballots rankings. Use CSTV for cross-cultural comparisons of solutions to international problems. CSTV could calculate rankings for the other candidates beyond number one. We would remove the winner from the ballots. Then find the next CSTV winner and give her second rank overall. Used this way CSTV could replace the Borda count often used to rank sports teams. It would eliminate punishing votes from such surveys. xc2.For seats in a legislature The votes of representatives elected by geographic districts equal those of PR list representatives in most legislative decisions. But in distributing seats, the geographic representatives are not subtracted 1 for 1 from the parys PR share of seats. So parties which win geographic searts get a percentage of lthe legislatures seats higher than their percentage of the popular vote. These seats will tend to go to the centrist parties. The party which wins the Presidency will often win the most geographic seats. Such parties will get power to control most legislation without reference to the small parties. This leads to the decisive, consistent policies that many politicians feel are needed for god government. The kicker comes when they vote on minority rights, especially when confirming justices to the Supreme Court. Then geographic representatives have no vote. Their parties get under represented. { - Unfortunately regional parties also get under represented.} xc2.For voting in a legislature On many issues, legislatures are likely to be polarized into distinct parties. But unlike Example 3, the coalitions tend to be closely matched in size. Sometimes, in such small electorates, voters aware of others preferences could conspire to manipulate the voting cycle and squeeze or the non-monotonicity of elimination steps. CSTV could be a good system for legis voting if field studies find that representatives rarely have a situation which they can manipulate to alter the winner. Matts copy p 1. For legislatures, CSTV might be best if simulations and field studies find that representatives rarely can use non-monotonicity to change an outcome.; and that non-monotonicity rarely alters an outcome by chance. (Thomas Hare called for a majority of first-place votes) not for STV By itself, CSTV can not lead to proportional legislative outcomes. That is, it can not led to a majority coalition of representatives winning only a majority of the legislative votes - and the minority groups winning their portions too. (Edmund Clarks tax, ______ insurance, and Hylland-Zeckhauser's point voting each attempt this. It has a solid ethical foundation. But it is doubtful any majority would willingly live under laws passed by a political minority. Yet it may be acceptable to create a system for proportional allocations (PA). This would allow each rep or small group of reps to allocate an equal piece from a PA budget. The PA budget would be a small, constitutionally-fixed percentage of the jurisdictions total budget [correlated with the highest tax bracket]. Minority reps would have a pork barrel just as majority reps do now. Voters may judge the values expressed by each reps use of her PA fund. Minority party supporters could not complain of taxation without (effective) representation. What can CSTV do for us? Not much as long as big businesses buy the reps reelections, and campaign funding, ads, and press releases provide politicians with means to misinform and mislead the voters [toward symbolize and] away from the basic issues that need democratic judgement/input. .c2.Effects of CSTV; Limited effects of voting systems Campaign funding, ads, and information non-proportional outcomes Proportional allocations Why do we need more than 2 candidates to choose from? - Pres 1. orgs Why do we need this way of counting votes? elects centrists, not manip. How does it work? - See Basics parts of CSTV Where is it approved? by review committees for political sci Journals, Tilth org, How has it worked in use? - [Tilth] How does it effect a community? It picks centrists from multi-party slates. The strong centrist tendency reduces incentives for extremism by politicians. Its multi-party qualities poor word, ability help young start-up and splinter parties which keep major parties open to change from below. It effectively combines the primary and general elections into one so more people vote in the primary which increases popular control of parties. CSTV has little chance of creating a stable multi-party system like those in European nations with proportional representation and multi-seat districts. That seems to require more than one winner from each voting district. .c1.Uses and misuses of CSTV Elections .c2. Unique officers of single-seat districts ; Uses Use CSTV to elect the chief executive of any organization which people cannot reasonably choose to move in and out of, for example mandatory nation-wide organizations for professionals and of course the nation itself. Elect a national president, secretary, treasurer, and chief council judges, attorneys general this way. One could design a government with a multi-party PR legislature and a multi-party C-STV election for president. This combines the advantages to fully represent the electorate representation of European PR with the separation of powers and balance of powers of the United States constitution. A popularly elected executive can provide stability and necessary action if the legislative parties ideological divisions defeat all resolutions for a time. sepparate executive-branch cabinet and bureuacracy whose president is elected via A professional organization which wants to represent only the center of its field could elect each officer by CSTV. (Dodgson or approval). But the professions practitioners and clients might be better served by several professional association each with a different agenda or point of view and each with a president elected by plurality to emphasize the groups deviation form center. If you want solidarity to dominate the moderate center of your field use CSTV. If you want diversity use plurality and break into smaller groups. In Seats, Votes, and the Spatial Organization of Elections, Gudgin and Taylor found anti-labor bias inherent in single-member districts due to the large majority of labor supporters in urban districts and the moderate majortiy for other parties in non-urban areas. This includes the whole jurisdiction so it leaves no wasted votes. A party could use CSTV to find its strongest nominee in a multi-candidate primary election. Citizens might use CSTV to elect their mayors if the major parties have approximately equal strength and where power often trades hands turning policies turn 180. Misuse Don't elect by CSTV nor PR legislatures the mayors for cities whose governments have been consistently leftist [of their electorates center of opinion] such as Berkeley, Burlington, or Madison nor for right-wing cities such as Salt Lake[Soiux Falls, Spokane or Sahvannah]. Don't elect CSTV mayors nor PR legislatures for consistently leftist governments of cities such as Berkeley, Burlington, or Madison nor for right-wing cities such as Salt Lake[Soiux Falls, Spokane or Sahvannah]. To use it in those places might decrease the range of diversity in U.S. cities and the accessable options for citizens or businesses seeking places which fit their political tastes. Check Berkeley with C. Bruce Lee and local news sources. .c2. Legislative representatives of multi-seat districts; All proposals and counter-proposals concerning electoral reform are [ultimately] based on alternative theories of parliamentary representation. At the core of all such theories are questions relating to the purpose of elections and the relationship of the legislature to the electorate. ...the goals of elections are to: 1) Produce a legislature that reflects the opinions of the electorate. or[, specifically through political parties. The resulting reform is at variance with other theoretical bases.] The ... 2) Produce a stable ruling majority in the legislature. or 3) Try to get the legislature into a negotiable situationwhere the reps want to listen carefully to the testimony of experts and citizens involved in a matter up for legislation or funding and want to find the best policy for the whole jurisdiction. (That contrasts with patronage or ideological situations where reps just help their own friends and supporters.) Find center, policies, a subset of 11a (&B). This doesnt equal plurality off-center parties nominees or platforms. Winners bias or multiplier precludes all forms of single-seat geographic districts: quote the definition from Seats, Votes... Misuse Dont use C-STV nor any Condorcet efficient rule to elect an entire a legislature. It forces the adoption of centrist policies on any party or candidate seeking to win an election. Both major parties will appear very much the same offering little choice to the voters whose ieny-meany-miney-mo ballots will and often producing only a weak majority for one party. This would not satisfy the first two criteria for representative government. It might not lead to one dominant party. Its results represent only a narrow slice in the middle of the electorate, and the governing party has only a small weak majority Indeed, because it gives third parties a good chance, C-STV might produce no majority party. Also, because it fails to represent a wide range of voices and ideas, the quality of government deliberations and decisions may drop. This proscription does not apply to organizations with purely voluntary membership. For example, Stockholders using C-STV to elect their board of directors would ensure the exclusion of fringe candidates whose tactics and goals, although appropriate elsewhere, might threaten this companys plans. Uses A jurisdiction large enough for a PR legislature might use C-STV create a moderate middle faction: 10 to 20% of the reps elected from single-seat geographic districts. Calculations for proportional representation of parties would not include these elections. Perhaps party labels would be banned. Germany has been fortunate to have such a moderate faction, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), balance power between the two major parties. Either of the major parties may ally with the majority of the centrist reps to form a working majority. These coalitions enact laws close to the center, yet it take into account more than the centrist point of view. In a typical PR legislature the small parties represent the political extremes. In a ruling coalition they pull the major partys policies and laws away from the center. That sometimes leads to laws too far from the electorates desires and wide policy flip flops when the other coalition wins an election. A prediction: A district rep will not adhere tightly to a party. Each districts rep must pursue pragmatic needs of her constituents if she wants to win re-election under C-STV(in geographic or income districts) . Such reps follow ideological doctrine and rigidity less than the reps from PR party lists. Most PR list systems let parties severely discipline any independently-minded rep by removing her name or moving it low on the next elections list, reducing her chances of re-election. A PR rep who negotiates or trades votes with other parties jeopardizes her career. Small party reps will still speak with the authortiy of MPs They will have the power to allocate some government funds. A politician may rise from positions in local governments, to a district seat (1 seat CSTV or 3 or 5 seat PR or STV), to a PR list seat and finally the CSTV Presidency. PR seats have more prestige than district seats. They have longer terms of office. Parties should give PR seats to the philosophers who take the long view. But in fact those seats go to the loyal ideologs chasing and inflaming the current passions of their party. To win a districts C-STV seat or the presidency one must appeal to a wide range of voters, usually by practising pragmatism and finding centrist compromises. So district reps resemble the president in policies and style, ends and means. List reps do not. List reps could be replaced at midterm. That suggests district seats lead to the presidency. But list reps usually get more national attention in parlements which have both. Problem 1 Gudgin and Taylor found that geographic electoral districts produce a right-leaning legislature compared to PR legislatures. This happens because labor party candidates win seats by large majorities in cities; but most reps hail from non-urban districts with slight right-of-center majorities. Economic housing patterns more than political gerimander?? cause this. CSTV will also produce a right leaning bias because it bases elections in single-seat geographic districts. Right-leaning C-STV reps will tend to form coalitions with the major party of the right. Thus a politys governments would consistently tend toward the right of the electorate. Therefore use single-vote additional member system so CSTV reps run with party lables. Voters desrve a chance to directly determine each partys list order. They might get a preference vote, as in Swisse, or a chance to vote in a party only primary. Problem 2 Traditional PR requires compromise policies by reps from several parties who together represent a majority of the voters. The semi-PR legislature could produce a coalition of the CSTV reps and one big party, both near the center and holding a majority of seats but representing the views of only a large minority of the voters. Find the s by me and WCL re: one could try to justify this by noting that the voters far from center can influence which centrist wins their districts seat. We can make a semi-PR city or county council with a small number of seats: Each seat will represent at least 8% and no more than 24% of the popular vote. The lower limit excludes fringe ideologies which cannot form compromise coalitions of at least some minimum size. The upper limit on a reps power requires at least three and usually four reps to vote together to pass a bill. A party that wins 8% (or more) of the popular vote gets 1 seat with a vote/weight/block of 8 (or more) legislative votes. A party that wins 24% (or more) of the popular vote gets 2 seats with 24 (or more) votes: the 2 reps get 12 (or more) votes each. At 48% (or more) of the popular vote a party wins 3 seats and 48 (or more) votes. Each of the 3 reps gets a weight of 16 (or more) votes. The chairperson, elected via C-STV, gets a weight of 12 to 16 legislative votes. A typical multi-party election would produce two reps for each of the major parties, II and III, one for each of two minor parties, I and IV, and one chairperson. With just seven reps the community has a broad and proportional representation of opinion accurately weighted. If a community wants a larger council, lower the upper or lower limits on reps power. The total of 116 votes requires 58 for a majority, 70 votes (60%) to override the executives veto, and 77 votes for the 66% usually needed to amend a constitution. Typical PR elections yield party strengths such as: A 8%, B 40%, C 35%, D 12%, unseated 5%. The likely coalitions are: Members votes Members votes Members votes Chair 16 Chair 16 Party B 40 Party B 40 Party C 35 Party C 35 Party A 8 Party D 12 64 63 75 Members votes Members votes Members votes Party B 40 Party C 35 Chair 16 Party A 8 Party D 12 Party A 8 Party D 12 Party A 8 Party D 14 50 55 The chairperson, as a member of most of these likely coalitions, will pull toward stable, consistent, centrist policies (goal 2); yet the chair and plurality party often need broad-based policies to attract the support of one other rep. The chair may facilitate compromises between the two major parties. (goal 3) Problem 1 does not pertain because geographic districts do not exist, the entire jurisdiction is one district. Problem 2 does pertain. A Condorcet winner is the appropriate person to moderate debates among other representatives. If the PR reps cant find a policy which at least a majortiy of them endorse, then probably the nation is too large to administrate that public good. That public good should, must, be administered on a smaller scale anything else would not satisfy most people. Decentralize or privatize or S-curve math compromise the policy. We should require a 2/3s majority of pure PR reps to pass a consitutional amendment. This will require an agrement by the 2 two major parties. They might agree to help major parties. Protecting minority rights will be the Supream Courts primary responsiblity. 1) majority vote total funding and tax level, no minority input. 2) majority vote fundable departments and projects. [3) Z-curve fundable projects for (10)% of total spending funds may not go to only 1 voting district: i.e. polity-wide schools and roads are OK, but not mass transit funding which helps only city residents, not harbors improvements which help coastal communities.] 4) majority and minority Z-curve distribution of tax burden and appropriations. Use C-STV to elect directly the chairperson of an STV legislative group. Multi-winner STV may be the best means for electing a very small legislative group of 3 or 5 reps, particularly for membership organizations where diversity of some sort is significant, parties are rare, or primary elections are impractical. Find the C-STV winner from the same ballots and do not eliminate her. Make her the chairperson. She is the person most appropriate to moderate debates among other representatives. She is particularly needed in organizations too small, informal, egalitarian, or simple in structure for a seperate Condorcet executive and a formal balence of powers. or demanding unity of purpose . Five-seat STV electoral districts result in reps from only two and occasionally three parties. But STV makes parties open-up to new candidates and ideas even more than primary elections do. In a primary, party politicians rarely dare to disturb party unity by challenging an incumbent directly. But under STV the challenge need not aim directly against any one incumbent. Also few people other than hardcore party members vote in a primary and they loyally vote for their incumbent. STV combines the open primary with the final election so a high percentage of voters turn-out to vote. Political scientists question whether or not STV results in proportional representation of parties. Often a partys share of seats correlates poorly with its share first-choice votes. But proportionality for such open parties is not meaningful, certainly not so important as for the ideologically rigid parties fostered by PR. But parties mean much less when they are so open. anyone may run. STV ballots formerly used in the U.S. have been criticized as too difficult for voters. They allowed dozens of candidates in one contest. The more candidates the harder it is to vote. So we must limit the number of candidates perhaps by requiring a large number of nominating signitures. Three viable parties, each limited to one nominee for each of the three or five seats would give nine or fifteen candidates. That limitation would not require a primary because voters at the final election decide which of a partys contenders win and which ones lose. Still, some voters would feel overwhelmed so an upper limit of 10 candidates might be best. Where parties form, I would reccomend the weighted PR described above. In that system a voter simply chooses one party from a handful of well known options. Legislative Voting As mentioned after the case study on page 15, CSTV is most subject to manipulation in committee voting. Dennis Mueller writes in a section titled Cycling, Thus it would seem that when committees are free to amend the issues proposed, cycles must be an ever present danger. (page64) If the amendments create a cycle, then CSTV starts to eliminate proposals. It is hard to manipulate that process, but it is possible. A committee could set procedures so that when a cycle occurs the chairperson may put the issue aside or continue debate and hold another election with fresh proposals. Particularly in elections with few voters or few voting blocks. Neimi and Riker cite a case in which the entry of a new last-place loser reverses the results of a Borda count. Surveys C-STV may have a limited use for surveys. Patient surveyors can use even more demanding and difficult to understand ballots that ask for cardinal scores. These may or may not give a more precise measure of the electorate's perceived utility for each candidate assuming the respondents are perfectly sincere and precise in their answers. footnote Multi-winner STV requires a candidate to get first choice votes from one third of the voters to win one of three open seats, from one-fifth of the voters to win one of five seats etc. If no candidate gets enough firsts, then we elminate the one with the fewest first and count her supporters second-choice votes as firsts. If a candidate gets a larger precentage of firsts than needed to win, we take the ballots which listed her first and shift that percentage of a vote to each second choice candidate. Thus each voter gets one full vote counted. Those voters who gave first place to the Condorcet winner have their ballots treated in the usual way: only excess votes, if any, are moved to help elect the voters second-choice candidate. (If all votes were moved then a candidate very near the chairperson would be elected next - and the little legislature would have a very narow range of experiences ideas and opinions.) .c1.Summary; I have extrapolated from cooberated research results to prove. . . Summary and Recommendations The articles topics form a spiral. 1a) C-STVs winners always beat M-STVs whenever if the two systems rules elect different winners. 2a) In the absence of voting cycles, / If cycles are rare / In most elections at least as many or more voters {generally / normally / usually not on ave} support C-STVs winners as those elected by any other voting rule, provided no manipulation succeeds. That is not be true when a voting cycle occurs because Blacks Borda picks centrists more often than C-STVs Hare. C-STV resists the manipulation of politicians introducing irrelevant alternatives better than M-STV and as well as any other rule. But it may be manipulated by creating a voting cycle. 1b) When both C-STV and M-STV / systems are manipulable, C-STV often is harder to manipulate resist better because it usually requires a larger number of voters to must coordinate their strategies. Each rule requires an identical number of voters for manipulation in the set of elections with voting cycles. It is more often monotone. 2b) C-STV is more often impossible to manipulate resist than any other voting system except M-STV. But voters can always create a cycle and in 15% to 75% of elections that would change the winner. In some of that percentage the sincere Condorcet winner still could win the election by manipulating the elimination process. M-STV resists better only when it suffers exhibits fails the more serious failure of not electing a candidate with majority support. M-STV resists better only when it inherently errs more seriously by failing to elect the one candidate whom a majority of voters support over every other candidate one. (C-STV will do no worse than M-STV even if manipulation of these elections succeeds. It will elect the same candidate.) 3a) With 100% Condorcet efficiency and strong resistance to manipulation, C-STV is the most reliable voting system means for way to elect the candidate whose support is broadest with the broadest support among voters. 3b) By electing only such widely supported candidates except in voting cycles, C-STV would create a poor legislature, one which would not represent the voices or views of minorities. 3c) But this new systems characteristics make it would be one of the best for electing a president; it resists manipulation well and almost always / reliably elects the candidates with the broadest support whom a majority support over any other candidate. I used rank-order ballots because they are less demanding of information and more equitable than utility ballots or single-vote plurality's rules of order. I optimized used Condorcet efficiency because it is less riddled rife with ambiguity and controversy than the utility measures are. I used Hare to resolve voting cycles because it is reportedly the least manipulable voting system. .c2.Conclusions; CSTV may be the best decision rule for large electorates. It is quick: all candidates are voted at once. It is simple and clear: voters dont need to consider which strategy to use or what each candidates chances are; they can simply rank the candidates honestly without losing some advantage. It is fair, 100%-Condorcet efficient, and it is decisive. .c2.Recommendations; The United States Supreme Court has set one man, one vote as the standard of fairness. for elections in this nation. Approval voting does not comply with this standard. Neither do the other utility voting systems such as standard score, Clark Tax, Hylland-Zeckhauser [sp.? Zekhauser] point voting, plus Kemeny and Borda. CSTV does fit this standard. this requirement So do Coombs, Copeland, Dodgson, and the max-min rules. Each voter is counted once in each pairwise comparison by Condorcets rule. For a decision on which candidate to eliminate, if any, each voter gets 1 vote of first choice. In each step 1 person is represented by 1 vote. Yet there is a very important place for a utility voting system: as a legislatures voting process. Given its strengths (effectively strategy-free, simple voting that always picks a moderate) and weaknesses (rare chances for manipulation and non-monotonicity) what are appropriate uses of CSTV? I intended it mainly for voting on answers to survey questions, or initiatives, resolutions and bills, with and without amendments, or on candidates for solitary positions such as judges, attorneys general, treasurers, and chief executives. It would be an excellent choice for electorates of more than 1,000 people where no one has much chance to know most others preference orderings, so no one can intelligently risk manipulation through CSTVs non-monotonic or cycle-and-squeeze frailties. It would improve democracy anywhere Hares MSTV is now used. drops fewest 1st place votes: C I have not fully evaluated CSTV for voting by the representatives within a legislature. Manipulation of most voting systems is easier with fewer voters. In European legislatures with strictly disciplined MPs who vote in party blocks, rivals can easily guess the preference orders of most MPs. This information makes manipulation under CSTV a real threat to majority rule. For committees where sincere voting is likely, the ABC rule (approval, Borda, Copeland) might be best. Niemi and Riker, and Straffin clearly showed the reasons for favoring Copelands Condorcet-completion rule. The addition of approval voting to Borda and Copeland ensures that a winner get at least 50% approval - or else further discussion may be required. In this as in all rank-order voting systems one option must be none or the status quo. If strategic voting is likely and the electorate is small (<1,000 voters), then Clark tax is best if the voters' financial resources are roughly equal. If not, then Merrills standard-score is best, if the voters understand probabilities and standard deviation. (A simple and accurate graphics interface and input device might broaden standard scores appeal.) If not then Brams approval voting is probably best. I cant yet recommend CSTV for small electorates because some voters might be able to manipulate the non-monotonicity patterns. In large electorates the voters probably can not use Clark tax or standard-score voting equitably. Approval voting is still a good choice - but, by most measures, the CSTV rule will be the best voting system. drops most last-place votes B & C tie - indecisive tie - indecisive after eliminating C tie - indecisive tie - indecisive Candidates A B C Approval 1 4 4 1 tie - indecisive Approval 2 5 8 5 Black (Con) Borda 9 12 6 CSTV (Con) Coombs Copeland (Con) 0 0 0 Dodgson (Con) 1 1 4 MSTV (Hare) Kemeny (Con) 1 1 3 Max-Min % (Con) -11 -11 -77 Nanson drops lowest Borda scorer: C Net percentage leads to rankings = Borda (Young 1974) Std-score (1,0,-1) 0 3 -3  Even unsophisticated voters must choose among several common strategies for approval voting: 1)Vote for the candidates you honestly approve of. 2)Vote for about half of the candidates. 3)Vote for one and only one of the top two candidates and as many minor candidates as you like better than that one. 4)Vote for just one of the top two candidates and dont bother with the rest. 5)Calculate your utility for each candidates victory. Add all of these scores and divide by the number of candidates to find the average utility score. Vote for all of the candidates who you score above that average. 6) An even more accurate and complex formula asks the voter to estimate each candidates chance of winning a tie in the election. GET BOOK IN LIB; PHOTOCOPY APPENDIX. 6) For a change in by laws or constitution, vote for all options you prefer over the status quo. The status quo stands as is if no option gets the required minimum of 50, 60, or 66%.  The measure of gain is sometimes money but most often is not specified. Money is not appropriate for primarily moral, ideological, and altruistic matters issues.  The formulas take the basic form 1/n ui (k) where k is a candidate, n is the number of candidates, and u is the voters utility for a candidate. (Merrill : Appendix) Include the tie factor.  Chamberlin, 1984 page 490, and Merrill page 67 used this technique to simulate approval votes from non-dichotomous data.  CSTV can not represent the breadth of opinion, interests and needs in a community. That function of governance requires direct or Proportional Representation (PR) in which each party receives a percentage of the legislatures seats equal to that partys percentage of the popular vote. The constitution for such a legislature should call for 3 or 5 seats in each voting district. ref Seats and Votes author and page # It can use list PR if the organization has political parties and many seats to fill from the parties lists of leaders. If the organization does not have parties or has few seats then it should use either PR with each representatives voting power weighted to equal her share of the popular vote, above some minimum, or the single transferable vote (STV). I suggest modifying STV which Australians now use for multi-seat electoral districts. STV should never eliminate a Condorcet candidate. Skip her and eliminate the candidate with the next fewest first-place votes. (I do not have space for a full description of STV. I recommend the discussion of its pros anc cons in ________. by __________ .) Under PR, tax revenues and public expenditures may be set through a (semi-) Proportional Appropriation (PA) system. This would give minority parties a say in [control over] where the government spends a small percentage of their supporters taxes.  If a citys majority are moderately leftist then CSTV will elect a moderate leftist. But pluratity voting often elects a candidate further from the center. {bell-curve graph} The Democratic nominee will stand to the left of the local center of political opinion. population. And in a liberal city the Democratic Partys leftist nominee will virtually always beat the Republicans nominee, if there is no third party. So in a few cities the mayors consistantly take policies to the left of the local center of opinion. If the leftist majority splits between two leftist candidates, a right-of-center candidate could win the plurality election. for Mayor of Berkeley  Ocassionaly multi-candidate STV will not elect the Condorcet winner (CW) if she is squeezed by nearby candidates as shown for single-winner STV in figure 2. Barring the elimination of CW might cause other centrist candidates with more first-place votes to be eliminated. One or two might have gotten enough votes transferred from the elimination of CW to stay in the race and win a seat. Thus some centrist voters would find their votes forcibly held for CW, whom they like less than some candidate with a narrower appeal. On the other hand, if the centrists manage to elect the candidates who sqeezed CW then other segments of the electorate will find their favorites eliminated and their votes transfered to CW. Thus it seems best to let CW be eliminated. If that happens she will become a non-voting chairperson perhaps the best position from which to moderate debates. The center will be over represented and the political wings excluded from such small legislatures. This pattern could hurt legitimacy.  Loring Condorcet, single transferable vote  valienation, and questions of div so i Wefairness to small parties n independant chiefdirectly ,uresallproduce inaction T centrist doctrinely discipline any independently more than political gerimander Answer 1 2 does pertain. "$$e !'4@ o q   g p / 1 u ! 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